Increases in the cost of providing health insurance must have some effect on labor markets, either in lower wages, changes in the composition of employment, or both. Despite a presumption that most of this effect will be in the form of lower wages, we document in this paper a significant effect on work hours as well. Using data from the CPS and the SIPP, we show that rising health insurance costs over the 1980s increased the hours worked of those with health insurance by up to 3 percent. We argue that this occurs because health insurance is a fixed cost, and as it becomes more expensive to provide, firms face an incentive to substitute hours per worker for the number of workers employed.
1 If employers could selectively provide health insurance to their workers, they would choose not to insure those workers who impose such wage constraints. Internal Revenue Code nondiscrimination rules, however, limit the ability of firms to provide differential health insurance benefits to their fulltime workers.
A second complication, which has been discussed much less, is the fact that health insurance is a fixed cost of employment while wages are a marginal cost per hour worked. Consequently, an increase in the cost of health benefits, even if offset by wage reductions, will alter the tradeoff that firms face in allocating labor input between hours per worker and the number of employees hired. In particular, raising fixed costs relative to marginal costs will lead firms to substitute increased hours of work per employee for additional numbers of workers.
Recent trends in the labor market suggest that such a shift--from the number of employees to increased hours per employee--has occurred. Between the late 1960s and the late 1970s, the average workweek for full-time workers fell by about 0.5 to 0.7 hours. Since the late 1970s, however, the workweek has increased, to about its 1960s level. Indeed, the increase in the workweek in recent years offsets a century-long trend towards fewer working hours (Costa 1997) . Anecdotal evidence suggests that at least some of this substitution results from an increase in benefits costs.
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Of course, there have been other economic changes in the past several decades that could also explain the recent trends in hours worked. Time spent working generally declines as incomes increase (Costa 1997) ; thus, the slowdown in aggregate income growth may help explain the changing trends in hours of work. In addition, demand for skilled relative to unskilled labor has increased (Katz and Murphy, 1992) ; if supply has not kept pace with the increase in demand, this could also account for lengthening workweeks.
In this paper, we examine empirically whether trends in hours of work can be partially explained by the rising costs of fixed benefits. We focus on health insurance because fully half of the increase in non-wage compensation costs from 1980-1990 is accounted for by increased expenditures on health insurance (most of the remaining increase in non-wage compensation over this period results from mandated expenditures on Social Security and workers= compensation). We begin by looking at the effect of health insurance on work hours controlling for individual characteristics and overall macroeconomic effects. Using data from the 1980 -1993 and the 1984-1992 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) we find that hours of work increased for those with health insurance by about 0.06 to 0.10 hours per week each year compared to those without health insurance. This change represents an increase of about 1.5 to 3.0 percent in labor input over a this period. We further show that hours increased more rapidly in industries that experienced rapid health insurance cost growth relative to industries with more restrained changes in health insurance costs. These results persist even when we consider alternative explanations for out findings such as changes in the demand for high-skilled relative to low-skilled workers, changes in marginal tax rates, and changes in the composition of workers with and without employer-provided health insurance.
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section discusses the theoretical impact of employer-provided health insurance on labor market outcomes. The second section summarizes previous evidence on fixed costs and work hours. The third and fourth sections present results on hours worked and insurance coverage. The fifth section examines whether these results can be explained by changes in the demand for skilled labor or tax-related changes in labor supply. The sixth section looks at potential composition bias, and the last section concludes.
I. Employer-Provided Health Insurance and Labor Input
This section sets forth a framework which formalizes the relationship between health insurance benefits and labor market outcomes. The representative consumer maximizes utility which is a function of labor supply and a composite consumption good comprised of benefits and other commodities whose purchase is financed with wage payments. The firm offers the worker a job with hours H and total compensation M. The worker can decide whether or not to accept the job, and will do so only if the utility from the job equals or exceeds a reservation level of utility. If the consumer accepts the job, he can choose the allocation of compensation between wages (W) and benefits (B).
Thus, the consumer solves the following problem:
where V(@) is a composite consumption good and P is the price of benefits. In the context of health insurance, B would be a measure of the generosity of the benefits package (e.g., deductible, copayment, choice of physician, etc.), while P would be the actuarially fair price of providing this coverage.
Rather than solve the consumer=s problem here, we simply note two things. First, the utility constraint in the consumer=s problem implicitly defines M as a function of both hours and the price of benefits, so that from the firm=s perspective, M=M (H,P) . Second, the consumer=s problem imposes an important constraint on the firm--that an increase in hours worked can only be achieved by increasing compensation such that the consumer is no worse off after the increase in labor supply than before.
Thus, the increasing disutility of work implies that total compensation is convex in H: M H >0, M HH >0.
The firm chooses the number of employees to hire and the hours per worker in order to maximize profits:
where f (@) is the firm=s production function with f N>0 and f O<0, N is the number of employees, and P is the price of providing benefits. 3 This production function makes the unrealistic assumption that only total hours of work affect output, which implies that from a production standpoint, hours and workers are perfect substitutes. Assuming a more general production function yields results that are qualitatively similar to those that we derive below, although the analytics are not as simple.
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Note that our framework assumes that the firm offers the employee a wage/hours bundle which the employee can choose to accept; the employer does not offer the employee an hourly wage and then allow the employee to choose how many hours to work (see Trejo 1991 for a similar formulation of the job as a wage/hours bundle). Because we allow employees to choose the division of compensation between wages and benefits, employees will value health insurance at or above its cost;
consequently, the results that we derive below will not arise from an inability of firms to reduce wages in response to higher health insurance costs.
The first order conditions from this maximization problem are: 3 We assume that the firm has some cost advantage in providing benefits so that it is in the best interests of both consumers and the firm for the firm to provide benefits rather than for the firm to pay only cash compensation, leaving individuals to purchase benefits in the private market. Firms have several likely cost advantages in providing benefits. By pooling their employees together as a group, firms can save on administrative expenses and reduce the costs associated with adverse selection. Expenditures on employee benefits also receive favorable tax treatment when made by firms rather than by individuals. 4 The derivation of the model with a more general production function is available from the authors. This condition has an intuitive interpretation: the firm will increase the hours worked by each employee until the marginal cost of an additional hour of work (the left-hand side of equation (4)) equals the average cost of an additional worker at the current level of hours (the right-hand side of equation (4)).
Totally differentiating this expression and rearranging terms allows us to solve for dH/dP:
The increasing marginal disutility of work implies that the denominator of this expression is always positive. The sign of the numerator is indeterminate, however. The effect of an increase in the price of benefits on hours worked depends on the average cost of an additional hour of work (M P /H) relative to the marginal cost of an additional hour of work (M PH ). Because an increase in the price of benefits raises the fixed cost associated with each worker, the firm will want to substitute hours per worker for the number of workers employed. However, in order to induce the workers to increase their labor supply, the firm must increase its wage and/or benefit payments. As long as the average hourly cost of providing benefits (M P /H) is greater than the marginal increase in compensation that must be made in order to induce an increase in labor supply (M PH ), the firm will find it optimal to increase hours per worker. At some point, however, the additional compensation required to elicit additional hours from its workforce will become so large that the firm will find it less costly to increase labor input through hiring additional workers, while at the same time scaling back on the hours of its existing labor force.
To calculate the effect of an increase in the price of benefits on the number of workers hired, we totally differentiate the π N first order condition and rearrange terms to get:
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There are two effects operating in equation (6). First, increases in health insurance costs induce firms to change the allocation of labor input between hours per employee and the number of workers, as discussed above (the substitution effect). This is seen in the first term on the right-hand side of equation (6). Thus, the effect on employment of an increase in the cost of benefits will be opposite the effect on hours: if dH/dP > 0, then dN/dP < 0, and vice versa. Second, as health insurance costs increase, so do total labor costs (M P > 0) and this induces firms to cut back on employment (the scale effect). This is seen in the second term on the right-hand side of equation (6); note that this term is negative because fO < 0. Thus, when equation (6) implies that firms have an incentive to increase their hours per employee in the face of rising health insurance costs, they will also unambiguously desire lower employment because the scale and substitution effects go in the same direction. When they face an incentive to decrease hours, however, the effect on employment will depend on the relative magnitudes of the substitution and scale effects in equation (6).
Note that the results above will continue to hold even if firms must pay a wage premium for overtime work. Although the overtime wage is a deterrent to increasing hours with or without fixed costs, an increase in fixed costs will increase the relative demand for both standard and overtime hours because both types of hours become less expensive relative to the costs of hiring an additional worker.
Our model suggests that increasing health insurance costs should affect both hours of work and total employment. Because the firm-level data required to examine changes in the number of employees hired is limited, we focus exclusively in this paper on the length of the work week, a dimension of the employment relationship that can be readily analyzed using individual-level data. We therefore consider in our empirical work whether hours of work have been affected by rising health insurance costs.
II. Evidence on the Relationship Between Fixed Costs and Hours Worked
There are two strands of literature which are similar in spirit to the aim of this paper. The first examines the effect of fixed employment costs on firm use of overtime (Ehrenberg 1971a and 1971b; Laudadio and Percy 1973; Nussbaum and Wise 1978; Solnick and Swimmer 1978; Ehrenberg and Schumann 1982) . These studies, which use plant-level or industry data on the use of overtime and industry data on nonwage labor costs, find rather consistently that an increase in nonwage labor costs relative to the overtime wage rate increases overtime.
The second strand of literature considers the effect of fixed costs on the employment of fullversus part-time labor. Owen (1979) finds that the ratio of part-to full-time employees is lower in industry-occupation groups which have higher indirect labor costs. Ehrenberg, Rosenberg and Li (1988) , in contrast, find little relationship between the relative likelihood of health insurance coverage for part-to full-time employees and the inter-industry ratio of part-to full-time employment. Montgomery and Cosgrove (1993) , in an analysis of child-care centers, find that the fraction of hours worked by part-time workers falls when the fraction of compensation accounted for by fringe benefits payments increases, while Montgomery (1988) finds some evidence both for and against the notion that higher fixed costs increase utilization of full-time labor. Overall, conclusions regarding the relationship between fixed costs and part-versus full-time employment appear to be somewhat tenuous.
There are a number of problems in using this literature to infer the effect of changes in the cost of insurance on employment outcomes. The first is that the bulk of this literature defines fixed costs as all nonwage labor costs. 5 In practice, however, many nonwage labor costs are not fixed. While health insurance expenditures, which comprise 32 percent of nonwage labor costs, are clearly a fixed cost, OASDHI contributions, which equal 25 percent of nonwage labor costs, represent a variable cost for workers who earn less than the Social Security maximum taxable earnings. Pensions, which total 23 percent of nonwage labor costs, are more difficult to classify. 6 Given the rather nebulous definition of fixed costs in this literature, interpreting the "fixed cost" coefficient as the effect of health insurance expenditures may be problematic.
Second, even if fixed costs were properly defined, aggregating health insurance with various other fixed costs may be inappropriate as so doing assumes that all fixed costs affect labor market outcomes the same way. If firms have the ability to partially offset higher fixed costs by paying lower wages because their employees value benefits, then the effect of any fixed cost will depend on the extent to which employees value the benefits derived from that cost. Employees may value a dollar spent on health insurance more or less than a dollar spent on life insurance, unemployment compensation, or pensions.
6 Data on nonwage compensation are from Piacentini and Foley (1992) .
Third, this literature typically assumes that nonwage labor costs are the same for all employees.
While for some costs, such as OASDHI contributions or costs incurred for training, this is likely to be true, for health insurance this is not necessarily the case. Firms that provide health insurance face tax penalties if the vast majority of full-time workers do not receive these benefits; they face no penalty, however, for exempting part-time and seasonal employees from health insurance coverage. Thus, aggregated benefits costs, at the industry or even at the firm level, do not necessarily represent the true fixed cost for any particular worker.
The empirical work which follows addresses all of these objections by focusing exclusively on health insurance and employment. Our analysis also differs from this literature in two other important ways. First, we use pooled cross-sectional data on individuals while the overtime literature and much of the part-time literature has used only firm-or industry-level data. While one source of data is not necessarily better than the other, the use of individual-level data allows us to control for a variety of supply-side factors affecting individual work decisions that cannot be accounted for with firm-level data. Second, the time span covered by our data, 1979-1992 , is much more current than that used in the overtime literature, in which the most recent data comes from 1976. Third, we use a comparison group of those without employer-provided health insurance to capture general changes in hours worked over time.
III. Trends in Health Insurance Costs and Hours of Work
We begin by documenting the changes in health insurance costs that have occurred between 1979 and 1992. We use data on employer spending for health insurance from the National Income and
Product Accounts. Figure 1 shows the trend in real ($1980) health insurance costs per full-time equivalent employee and per covered employee. Both measures of costs have risen steadily over the period. In 1979, the average cost of health insurance per covered employee was about $1,500; by 1992, costs had risen to almost $3,000, about twice as high. In contrast, real wages per worker increased by only 7 percent over this period.
To measure trends in hours worked, we employ data from the 1980-1993 March Current Population Surveys (CPS). 7 In addition to a wide array of demographic characteristics, this data set includes information on usual weekly hours worked during the previous year and whether an individual was covered by employer-provided health insurance through his or her employer during the previous 7 For a more detailed discussion of trends in hours worked, see Coleman (1993a and 1993b) .
year. 8 The sample is restricted to men aged 25-54 who were not self-employed. We examine the hours worked of men because coordinating benefits is likely to be an important element in female labor force participation and choice of hours. Focusing on prime age males eliminates changes in hours due to school enrollment or retirement. The self-employed are excluded because their labor market decisions will not depend on the cost of benefits in the same way as do the hours worked of those who are employed by firms.
Unfortunately, the CPS asks only about average hours on all jobs in the previous year; it does not ask about average hours on each job. In 1989, however, only 6.2 percent of the work force held more than one job simultaneously (Stinson, 1990) . The potential for multiple job-holding to confound the results on hours worked that we find is therefore small. We use the March CPS data because it is the longest continuous survey that asks about both health insurance coverage and hours of work.
Wage data for the individuals in the sample were obtained by merging the March CPS with the CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) data set which contains wage information for the CPS households. 9 We exclude individuals who report wages below $1.65 per hour in 1980 dollars (roughly the real minimum wage over the period) or above $57 per hour in 1980 dollars (roughly the real topcoding level in 1993). Summary statistics on the CPS data set are provided in the first column of Table 1 . Overall, 84 percent of the sample have employer-provided health insurance in their own name while the average work week is 43.5 hours.
As noted above, IRS non-discrimination rules require health insurance to be offered to almost all full-time workers if it is offered at all, where full-time employees are generally defined as those working over 1,000 hours per year. Part-year workers, however, are exempt from the nondiscrimination tests even if they work full-time when employed. To account for this, we also 9 We use wages from the CPS MORG data rather than imputing wages from the March CPS (annual earnings divided by annual weeks worked times average hours per week) for three reasons. First, the March earnings data refer to the previous calendar year and are the likely to contain more noise than wages reported in the CPS MORG. Second, an imputed wage from the March data would be negatively correlated with any measurement error in hours worked, thus leading to a spurious negative relationship between wages and hours worked. Third, there is evidence to suggest that individuals give their current health insurance status when answering the health insurance questions in the March CPS (Swartz 1986 ); thus wages from the MORG will correspond more closely to the individual=s wage associated with the job from which he receives health insurance than will an imputed wage from the March CPS. Empirically, the two wage measures are fairly highly correlated (about 0.5). In matching the March and MORG data, we were able to successfully merge 86 percent of individuals. This ratio compares favorably with that reported by other individuals who have merged various months of the CPS. restrict our sample to those who worked 40 or more weeks in the previous year. Note that we cannot restrict our sample on the basis of hours worked because this is our dependent variable. While the trends documented in Figure 2 are supportive of the argument that health insurance costs have lead to changes in employer behavior, they do not account for other changes that have taken place between 1979 and 1992 (such as the two recessions which are apparent in Figure 2 ) or for individual characteristics that could also have affected both insurance coverage and hours worked. We therefore turn to an econometric model to estimate the effect of increasing health insurance costs on hours worked.
IV. Estimating the Effect of Health Insurance Coverage on Hours Worked

A. Basic Results
We begin by estimating an equation of the following form:
where HI is a dummy variable which indicates whether the individual received health insurance from his employer in the previous year, Time is a linear time trend, Year is a vector of year dummy variables, 10 and Z includes other individual and job characteristics that may also influence labor supply, 10 We could replace the main effect estimated by our year dummy variables with a simple linear time trend. We prefer year dummy variables because they allow us to control for changes in economic conditions in a very general way. For example, with year dummy variables in the regression, the coefficient on a statespecific unemployment rate is generally insignificant (and therefore, we do not include it in the regression
such as age and its square, 11 education (indicator variables for less than high school; high school degree; some college; and a college degree or beyond), marital status, and 1-digit industry and occupation dummy variables. In order to capture changes in the demand for skilled and unskilled workers over time, we also interact our education dummies with a time trend (Katz and Murphy 1992) .
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The coefficient of interest, β 3 , captures the differential effect over time on hours worked for those in jobs with health insurance relative to those without health insurance. If the rising cost of health insurance has resulted in a lengthened work week for those with health insurance, we would expect the coefficient on β 3 to be positive.
This estimation strategy will only be valid if trends in work hours for employees with and without health insurance would otherwise be the same (conditional on demographic characteristics) in the absence of health insurance . Appendix Table 1 shows some evidence on the similarity of the two groups. Workers with health insurance from their employer are more educated, older, and earn higher results presented in this paper). The conclusions with respect to hours worked, the focus of this paper, are not sensitive to whether the regressions are estimated with a time trend or a series of year dummy variables.
wages than workers without health insurance from their employer. But there is a surprising amount of overlap in the two groups. The share of workers without a high school degree, for example, is only twice as high for the group without health insurance as for the group with health insurance, and the median wage for the group without health insurance is above the 25 th percentile wage for the group with health insurance.
This similarity may arise from the fact that the firm=s decision to offer health insurance is made for all employees, not on an individual-by-individual basis. Thus, low-wage workers who work in high-wage firms will be more likely to receive health insurance, while high-wage workers employed in low-wage firms will be less likely to receive health insurance. This type of variation is natural to exploit in our estimation. It therefore seems reasonable that if we control for the demographic differences between the two groups we can identify the effects of health insurance on work hours using the residual variation in the groups with and without employment-based insurance.
The results from estimating equation (7) are presented in the first column of Table 2 . The coefficients on the demographic variables reveal that hours worked increase with age, although at a declining rate, and are higher for those who are married or who have health insurance. College graduates (the omitted educational category) work more hours than those with less education, and over time those with more education have worked increasingly more hours relative to their less educated counterparts.
The coefficient on the key variable of interest, Time*Health Insurance, is equal to 0.057 and is statistically significant at conventional levels. 13 This effect is substantively large; it implies that over the 13 In unreported regressions, we have estimated the coefficient on health insurance separately by year. The effect of health insurance on hours worked rises substantially between 1979 and 1982, declines slightly through 1986, and then increases again after 1986. Estimating the regressions for sub-samples of the data is somewhat sensitive to the particular years chosen. We focus on the 1979-92 period in part because it is the longest sample and in part because the state of the macroeconomy was similar in those two years.
1979-1992 time period, the work week for those with health insurance increased by about 0.7 (0.057 x 13) hours per week relative to the work week of those without health insurance. Recall that the overall difference in the trend in hours worked between the two groups is 1.2 hours per week; our estimates suggest that health insurance can explain about 60 percent of this overall effect. Alternatively, since the average work week of full-year workers is about 43 hours, this effect corresponds to a 2 percent increase in labor input for those with health insurance (holding total employment constant).
To address where the increase in hours worked is coming from--to what extent is the increase in hours driven by part-time workers who are now working full-time, and to what extent do we see fulltime workers moving to overtime--we estimated a multinomial logit model for the probability that an individual works less than 25 hours per week, between 25 and 39 hours per week, exactly 40 hours per week, and more than 40 hours per week.
14 Although we do not report the coefficient estimates from this multinomial logit estimation, the Based on unreported multinomial logit estimates.
B. Incorporating Data on Health Insurance Costs
To validate the contention that increased health insurance costs are driving the increase in hours worked, we incorporate information on changes in the average per worker cost of providing health insurance by industry. If firms are increasing the work week in order to avoid incurring the health insurance expenditures associated with hiring new employees, then weekly hours should increase proportionately more in industries in which health insurance is more expensive to provide.
To test this, we use data from the Commerce Department on employer spending for health insurance by industry in 1979 and 1992. 15 The Commerce Department collects data on total spending on health insurance and on total employment by industry. We divide total industry spending by total employment to get cost per worker; we then adjust this measure by the fraction of insured workers in each industry (a number that we calculate from the Current Population Survey) to get cost per insured worker by industry. Finally, we compute the percentage change in cost per insured worker from 1979 to 1992. The data are available for 53 industries and include all workers except for some service sector workers and government employees. 16 Appendix Table 2 reports the estimates of cost by industry in 15 Although the Commerce Department reports health insurance expenditures on an annual basis, the survey used to derive the expenditure data is conducted only once every 5 years; numbers for the intervening years are interpolated. For this reason, we use cost data that correspond to the first and last year of our CPS data set rather than the annual cost data. 16 We exclude individuals in three small service sector industries because we were unable to confidently match the fraction of insured workers in the CPS to the detailed industry groups used by the Commerce Department. Government workers are excluded because the Commerce Department does not report health insurance expenditures for the government sector. Backing out costs for government workers is impossible 1992 and the estimates of cost increase from 1979-92. Tobacco is the industry with both the highest cost in 1992 ($10,568 per insured worker) and the highest increase in cost from 1979-92 (243%), while Local Passenger Transportation has the lowest cost in 1992 ($1,158 per worker) and the lowest increase in cost from 1979-1992 (78%). The fact that tobacco has such a high level of spending may be a bit anomalous; most of the industries with very high costs are manufacturing or primary goods industries with older, married workers, and generous benefits.
17 Note that there is substantial variation across industries in both the level and the growth of health insurance costs.
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To examine how industries with different costs responded in their hours decisions, we augment equation (7) to:
where ∆Cost is the percentage change in the industry average cost per insured worker from 1979 to 1992.
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In this specification, the coefficient β 5 gives the changes over time in average hours for workers without health insurance in industries with high relative to low health insurance cost growth.
because spending for many government workers (for example, public school teachers) are allocated to other industries. 17 We have estimated models excluding tobacco and other industries with very high costs and obtained results that were very similar to those using all industries.
18 Differences in health insurance cost growth across industries may result from several factors including changes in the demographic composition, particularly age or family status, of the employees within the industry; changes in the generosity of the benefits package; or changes in lifestyle behavior, such as smoking, that affect the average health of insured workers. ∆Cost varies only by industry; within industry, it is constant over time. Note that this implicitly interpolates a linear trend in cost increases over the sample period. We obtain similar results when restrict the estimation to the beginning and final years in the sample (1979-80 and 1991-92 
The coefficient β 6 measures the trend change for those with health insurance compared to those without health insurance in industries with no cost growth, and β 7 captures the differential trend for those with health insurance in industries with high relative to low cost growth.
In the context of the model presented in Section I, the numbers in Appendix Table 2 present a measure of P@B rather than of P alone. Consequently, equation (8) is an empirical specification for estimating dH/dP@B rather than dH/dP. However, as long as health insurance is inelastically demanded, we know that dPB/dP>0. Available empirical evidence suggests that the demand for health insurance is price inelastic, and thus the sign of dH/dP@B will be the same as that for dH/dP. Table 2 . 21 The negative coefficient on the Time*Health Insurance interaction (-0.089) may seem puzzling at first. But this coefficient is the reduction in hours worked for a worker in a hypothetical industry with no cost increase over time. This is far out of the sample for our data. For reasonable values of cost increase, the regression predicts increases in hours for all those with health insurance.
While the results in Table 3 are suggestive, they should be regarded with a bit of caution because of the potential endogeneity of benefits expenditures--an increase in the price of health insurance may affect the generosity of the benefits package, B, as well as hours worked (although, as noted earlier, empirical evidence suggests that the demand for health insurance is price inelastic so that this endogeneity bias may not be that severe) . The direction of this bias is unclear. If health insurance is like other goods so that an increase in the price of health insurance benefits leads to a decrease in the demand for health insurance, then industries with the highest cost growth are those that should adopt the greatest reductions in their benefits packages. This will bias the coefficient on cost growth toward zero, making us less likely to find an effect of cost growth on hours worked. The fact that we do find such an effect, even with this bias, thus works in our favor.
However, the effect could go in the opposite direction because health insurance is not like other goods. In particular, an increase in the price of health insurance generated by an increase in the cost of medical care may make health insurance more valuable, increasing the demand for such benefits. Insurance products are thus fundamentally different from other goods in this regard.
Moreover, the process generating an increase in the cost of health insurance may not be uncorrelated with hours worked. For example, medical care expenditures tend to increase with age making health insurance more valuable, but both labor supply and labor demand may depend on age as well. To address this latter possibility we have run our cost regression using residual cost growth after accounting for changes in the age and family structure of each industry as our measure of ∆Cost. The results are very similar to those reported in Table 3 .
Overall, there are several factors which could bias the results in Table 3 in either direction.
Whether these effects are likely to cancel out is unclear. Nonetheless, the results in Table 3 are consistent with the notion that there is a relationship between the growth of health insurance costs and changes in hours worked.
V. Controlling for Skill-Based Explanations
The results above attributed the increase in hours worked to rising health insurance costs.
These changes may alternatively be the result of general changes in labor demand or labor supply that are correlated with the receipt of health insurance. Since employees with health insurance may be more skilled than employees without health insurance, changes in the demand for skilled and unskilled workers may affect hours worked for these two groups. To the extent that our empirical specification does not fully capture skill level, this provides an alternative explanation for our results.
The finding that increases in hours of work are associated with health insurance costs across industries suggests that changes in skill demand are not the full explanation for the findings we observe.
Nevertheless, to address this issue directly, we consider how employer-provided insurance affects hours of work for workers with different wages. If our results are driven by changes in the demand for skilled workers, we should see that among those with health insurance, hours should increase more rapidly for high-wage than for low-wage workers. The benefit cost explanation, in contrast, does not predict any particular relationship between health insurance costs and hours of work for workers with different wages. The response will differ based on how convex the labor supply schedule is for each worker.
To test this, we augment equation (7) to:
In this specification, β 3 is the difference in average hours for high-relative to low-wage workers, β 5 is the change over time in average hours by wage for workers without health insurance, and β 7 is the trend change by wage for those with health insurance compared to those without health insurance. The skill-bias explanation predicts that β 7 is positive (the effect of health insurance on hours worked over time is greater for workers with high wages), while the health insurance cost explanation offers no clear prediction.
What we would really like in estimating equation (9) is a measure of total compensation. The data, however, only includes hourly wages, and using hourly wages in equation (9) may lead to error since we would expect employers to reduce wages when they provide health insurance. To reduce any potential biases we divide the population into three roughly equally-sized groups based on a predicted wage imputed from a regression of actual wages on our independent variables.
The coefficients on wages and wage trends are reported in Table 4 . The first panel reports hours differences by wage level for workers without health insurance. Among those without employer provided health insurance, hours are roughly similar for workers of all wage levels. The next panel gives the difference in hours worked by wage level for those with health insurance. In this case, low wage workers with health insurance work more hours on average than high wage workers with health insurance, a result consistent with the notion that benefits are relatively more costly for low wage 
workers. The next panel gives the trend in hours worked for workers without health insurance.
Relative to high wage employees, medium wage employees have seen modest, but not statistically significant, reduction in hours worked over time, while low wage employees have experienced an even greater decrease in hours. This is consistent with the literature documenting large increases in the relative demand for high-wage workers over time.
After accounting for these trends, hours worked increased by roughly the same amount for all workers with health insurance, regardless of wage level (the last panel in Table 4 ). This result is inconsistent with an explanation that health insurance is merely proxying for unmeasured skill and is consistent with the model that health insurance costs have driven the increase in hours worked. We obtain qualitatively similar results if we estimate equation (7) separately for each of the three wage groups rather than estimating equation (9) in which wages are interacted with the dependent variables of interest.
The second column of Table 4 presents regression coefficients analogous to those in the first column, only stratified by education rather than wage level. The results here are very similar.
Although the education coefficients are somewhat more variable than the wage coefficients in the last panel, they show an increase in hours worked for all workers with health insurance, regardless of educational attainment. Furthermore, there is no pattern which would suggest that the coefficients reflect an increase in the demand for skilled workers that is not picked up by including Time*Education in the regression.
Another significant change that occurred between 1979 and 1992 was a substantial reduction in marginal tax rates, especially for high-wage workers. To the extent that health insurance is correlated with wages, the estimated hours increase of those with health insurance may have been a labor supply response to the change in the after-tax wage rate for this group. However, conditional on wages, this response should not differ for those with and without health insurance, and will thus be accounted for by the Time*Wage interactions in Table 4 (indeed, the increasing pattern of Time*Wage coefficients is consistent with both an increase in the demand for skilled workers, and a tax-rate induced increase in the labor supply of high-wage workers).
VI. Changes in The Composition of Workers with Health Insurance
A final concern is that the earlier results are biased because of changes in the composition of workers with health insurance. Bias from composition changes may work in either direction. Suppose first that over time there is a decline in health insurance coverage for workers with fewer hours of work compared to workers with higher hours of work.
22 As a result of this change in the insured population, the pool of workers with health insurance will become increasingly concentrated among those who work longer hours, and it will appear that hours of work are increasing among those with health insurance. In fact, the share of workers in our CPS sample with health insurance from their employer fell by over 10 percentage points between 1979 and 1992 ( Figure 3 ), suggesting that composition bias is potentially a problem.
23
Composition change may also bias the coefficients towards zero, however. If workers who move in and out of coverage have smaller increases in hours than workers with permanent coverage (because their coverage may be dropped if costs rise sufficiently), the observed increase in hours for 22 Tabulations from the SIPP data described below suggest that this is indeed the case. For workers who were continuously insured over the SIPP sample period, average initial weekly hours equaled 44.2. In contrast, the average initial weekly hours of those who lost their health insurance coverage was 43.8. 23 While some of this decline is due to changes in the CPS questionnaire in 1988 (Levit, Olin and Letsch 1992) , there is still a large decline even excluding the change in 1988.
those with health insurance will understate the true increase for those with health insurance throughout the sample.
The appropriate solution to this composition problem is to eliminate from the estimation workers who are insured in some years but not in other years. Suppose we were able to limit the estimation to workers who had health insurance in each of two consecutive years or who did not have health insurance in either year. Because no worker changed health insurance status, there is no composition bias in measuring changes in average hours for these two groups. Restricting the sample to those with fixed health insurance status thus solves the composition problem.
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In principle, we could address this issue with the CPS by linking individuals in two consecutive March surveys. This, however, would only allow us to observe whether health insurance coverage was constant at two points in time that are one-year apart. Instead, we turn to the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) which follows individuals for two to four years. This allows us to observe whether or not health insurance coverage is constant for a much longer period of time. We use data from the 1984-1992 SIPP panels, which cover a period of time between 1983 and 1994. Each panel consists of between 30,000 and 60,000 individuals who are interviewed every 4th month for two to four years (these interviews are termed "waves"). Because the same individual is followed over time, we can look at hours changes for workers who have health insurance continuously over the period compared to workers without health insurance at any time. 24 Alternatively, if changes in health insurance coverage were random, we could examine the changes over time in the incremental hours worked for those whose health insurance coverage status changed. This approach has been used to estimate the wage differential associated with union membership. Because the initiation or loss of health insurance coverage is not likely to be random, however, we do not adopt this approach.
As with the CPS, we restrict the sample to men between the ages of 25 and 54 who were not self-employed in any wave. We also impose the same weeks worked and wage restrictions as in the CPS. 25 We omit waves in which an individual did not work. The resulting sample contains 288,543
observations on 52,815 individuals. 26 Summary statistics for our SIPP sample are presented in Table 1 .
As can been seen, individuals in this dataset look very similar to their CPS counterparts (although wages are somewhat higher).
We begin by using these data to replicate our basic CPS results presented in column 1 of Table   2 . Thus, we first estimate equation (7) using all individuals regardless of whether their health insurance status changed over time. 27 These results are presented in the second column of 28 The finding of a larger health insurance effect than in the CPS data is potentially explicable by measurement error in the CPS. Although the CPS asks about annual health insurance coverage, comparisons of coverage rates in the CPS and the SIPP suggest that at least some people answer the 25 The weeks worked cutoff in the CPS is 40 weeks in the previous year. The analog to this in the SIPP is 13 weeks in the previous four months (the previous wave). 26 Appendix Table 4 shows the sample sizes for each SIPP panel. 27 We make one change from the specification in equation (7). The SIPP data have observations in every month of each year of our sample period (with the exception of the first and last year). The CPS, in contrast, has observations from the same month of every year--March. In the CPS regressions of Tables 2 through 4 , we use a complete set of year dummies to control for macroeconomic factors. The CPS results, however, are substantively the same when a time trend is used rather than year dummies. We therefore use a simple linear time trend in our SIPP regressions, rather than a complete set of month and year dummies. 28 The one notable difference between the demographic coefficients from the CPS and the SIPP is that the interactions between education and time are not significant in the SIPP. Note, however, that the coefficients on these interactions follow the same pattern (increasing with education) as in the CPS. CPS question as if it refers to current health insurance status. 29 The resulting measurement error will bias the CPS estimates towards zero.
29 See Swartz (1986) for a more detailed discussion.
The coefficient of interest, that on the interaction between health insurance and the time trend, suggests an even larger increase in hours than estimated from the CPS. Compared to workers without health insurance, workers with health insurance have seen an increase in their hours of about 0.14 hours per week each year, or 1.7 hours over the SIPP time period. This effect is larger than that estimated using the CPS in Table 2 , but of a similar magnitude to that estimated in Table 3 using data on health insurance costs.
To examine the importance of composition bias, in the third column of Table 5 we restrict the sample to workers with health insurance in each interview (about two-thirds of the sample) and workers without health insurance in any interview (about 10 percent of the sample). The coefficients from this regression are similar to those in the second column. In particular, the interaction between health insurance and the time trend remains positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficient is only 30 percent smaller than that in column 2, suggesting that composition bias can explain only a part of the estimated increase in hours worked of those with health insurance. The point estimate implies that the hours of those with health insurance have increased by about 0.10 hours per week each year, or roughly a 3 percent increase in labor input over the 12-year SIPP sample period.
We thus conclude that composition bias cannot explain the trends in hours worked noted above.
VII. Conclusions
Increasing health insurance costs must have some effect on labor markets --either in lower wages, changes in the composition of employment, or both. Despite the economic presumption that health insurance costs should only affect wages, we document in this paper large effects of health insurance on work hours as well. We show that rising health costs between 1979 and 1992 increased hours worked of those with health insurance by up to 3 percent. We argue that this finding occurs because health insurance is a fixed cost, and as it becomes more expensive to provide, firms face an incentive to substitute hours per worker for employment.
Our results suggest several important considerations for the ongoing debate about health care
reform. The results clearly show that rising health costs are not "neutral." If the hours increase we document is used as a complement to lower employment, our results imply very large and ongoing changes in the distribution of employees across jobs. Workers who cannot be employed in jobs with health insurance will crowd jobs without health insurance, lowering wages and potentially limiting total employment. Examining in more detail whether the corresponding employment response has occurred is clearly one avenue for future research.
In addition, there are many other labor market outcomes that have been anecdotally linked to the rising cost of benefits provision, such as an increased employment of part-time and temporary workers and an increased sorting of workers among firms on the basis of preferences for health benefits. A richer framework than that specified in this paper would generate many of these predictions, and their empirical validation is an important area for research that will enhance our understanding of the relationship between the structure of employment and the provision of employee benefits. ($1980) hourly wage between $1.65 and $57, who were not self-employed, and who worked more than 39 weeks in the previous year (CPS) or more than 14 weeks in the previous four months (SIPP). Standard deviations are in parentheses. All regressions have the same controls as in Table 2 . Health insurance cost is in thousands of dollars. Sample is weighted to national totals. Standard errors are in parentheses. Predicted wage is based on a regression of hourly wages on the independent variables noted in Table 2 (without the health insurance terms). The regression includes all of the controls in Table 2 . Sample is weighted to national totals. Standard errors are in parentheses.
